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Introduction: Some General Comments
Ai this time, the beginning of the 75t^ /21st century, the distance
between Islamic and secular traditions seems wider than at any
time in living memory. This special edition is our attempt to open
serious debate among legal scholars about the shari'ah.
We have chosen a number of specialised topics each of which
raises difficult issues (see below), and thus force us to enter into
debate and provide possible answers. We are weil aware that an-
swers are conditioned by time and place and, in the case of shari'ah,
can never be final or binding for all time. But it is our time which
is important; the truths of God's revealed message, through the
Prophet Muhammad are, of course timeless; but each age must get
from them practical answers and practical solutions to the issues
of the day.
Islam is sometimes described as a theology in legal form. This
means a number of things: first, that the individual's duty is to
both God and man but primarily to God; second, that the revealed
truths (in Qur'An) are absolute and set the agenda for individual
(legal) obligations; third, that ethics, morality and prescription are
undifferentiated. There are wider implications: for example, that
it is the duty of the ruler (government) to implement the shari'nh
(law) in the broadest sense; and that revelation is ultimately the
superior form of authority and so takes precedence over whatev-
er constitution is in force. These are the internal 'classical' posi-
tions developed over the past 1400 years by means of a complex
and sophisticated jurisprudence.
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That jurisprudence has not been developed by way of prece-
dent, or by way of codification but by way of scholarship. The
nearest parallel for the European traditions is the canon law at the
time of Aquinas. Like the canon law, Isiamic scholasticism began
from the fixed principle of revelation contained in a text, original-
Iy received orally but later written down, the Qur'An. It is a mat-
ter of debate whether the scholarly commentary developed a 'nat-
ural law' (as happened in Europe) or whether the primacy of rev-
elation made the discussion turn in on itself, so resulting in a mi-
nutiae of glosses. There is evidence for both views.
Whatever might be the answer 
-and the debate continues-the whole shari'ah discussion assumes a static ummat (the totaiity of
believers) in which social, linguistic and cultural differences could
be subsumed in submission to God. Of course this is the ideal, and
it was never, in fact, practical reality. However, each Muslim polity
throughout history took this as a given and worked toward it (or
breached it) whiie attempting to justify itself in the given terms. It
was a self-contained universe in law. It depended on the revealed
text, Qur'An; the divinely inspired practice of the Prophet Muham-
mad, Sunnnh; and the consensus of the recognised jurists, ijmh' .It is
through the latter, the classic text books, that we 'know' the former.
However, there is another path to knowing. This is ijtihAd, an in-
formed recourse to Qur'in and. Sunnah. IjilhAd does not necessarily
mean rejecting the text books but it certainly does not give them the
traditional primacy. The limits of ijtihfrd are, of course, always de-
bated and, as with the other two monotheisms (]udaism and Chris-
tianity), there will never be a conclusion to that debate. This is an
accepted position in contemporary Indonesian Islam.
South-east Asia: The Pre-Modern Law Texts
Islam in what is now Indonesia, Malaysia and the southern Phil-
ippines dates from the 15th century. it has left an extensive legacy in
literature, philosophy and law. The key notion to keep in mind in
assessing this legacy is the idea of 'selection'. As with other Muslim
lands outside the Arab heartland, the recipient cultures selected
from the classical heritage that which they found useful or appro-
priaie. This does not mean that the provincial cultures were, or are,
less 'Muslim'. On the contrary, belief and identity as 'Muslim' are
as strong in South-east Asia as in Arabia. It does, howevet, mean
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that the local cultural and language forms determined what Islam
meant locally. In the broad sweep of Muslim history one can truly
speak of 'Islams' just as one would speak of various forms of Chris-
tianity. The ummat is one but the expression of the faith is culturally
defined. There is no dispute about this as a fact, but there have
always been movements from within Islam to minimise or do away
with the cultural variations which have existed for centuries.
The pre-modern texts date from these earlier centuries. They
are valuable today because they show us how selections are made
and for what purpose. It is purpose, or rather, the idea of pur-
poseful selection, which characterises South-east Asian Islamic law.
There is a vast complex of texts running into many hundreds of
manuscripts. The 19'r'century European scholars, in the age of high
imperialism (see below), read the material as corruption of the
'pure' Islamic law. The reason is obvious: while the texts do cer-
tainly contain elements of Islamic law, they also contain indige-
nous rules. This was thought to be a 'corruption' of the classical
heritage. This idea of 'corruption' has persisted into the colonial
and contemporary eras with sometimes unfortunate results.
A good example is the Malayan law text, Undang-Undang Melakn
(Liaw, 1976), which dates from the 17'h century and was the most
influential text for the succeeding two centuries. The text is short
and has three parts, which respectively deal with debt and debt
bondage, marriage and divorce and property rights. The first and
the last represent local custom (adat) whllst marriage and divorce
are recognisably derived from Islamic law. Perhaps most interest-
ing is an interpolated section, which classifies the sources of law as
(a) reason, (b) Islam and (c) customs of the country. A diversity of
sources is recognised and, where there is conflict or inconsistency,
then the Islamic element is ranked lower than the other two. The
evidence from this text and other, later Malay-Muslim texts is that
Islam was not the only source for law in the Muslim sultanates.
While the genealogies of these sultanates lay great stress on rela-
tionships with the West Asian (that is, Middle Eastern) countries of
Arab/Islamic culfure, this is not followed through in the law texts.
Both, however, were produced at the same time and commissioned
by the same ruler(s) and must, therefore, be read together.
The result of this reading is to show that source and selection
of Islamic principle is not haphazard or incompetent. On the con-
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trary it shows a degree of originality in using Islamic principle for
a purpose, namely to legitimise the ruler 'by reference to' Islam.
The religion here meant noi just revelation but also attachment to
the'superior'West Asian civilisation. Some of the Malay-Musiim
texts, in fact, include genealogies relating the texts' patrons to fa-
mous, ideal rulers of that area. While these might be fanciful in
the historical sense, they were real for those who commissioned
them. One might caII these efforts 'myth'but, on another level,
myths can also state truths. In our example, it is the illustration of
the assimilation of foreign legal values. Of course the result is in-
consistent but that is inevitable in any sort of cultural borrowing.
By the end of the l8th century there is a corpus of 'Muslim'
texts, produced in and for the royal courts, which define sover-
eignty, rule and state. We would now call these'public order' or
'public law' texts. In the earlier texts God's revealed message is
subordinated to Islam used as a definition of sovereignty. The
patrons of these earlier texts were theologically illiterate but there
is nothing new in this, present day politicians are, after all, usually
constitutionally illiterate. By the end of the 18th century, however,
a much greater degree of theological understanding can be shown;
but, at the same time, the tension between the absoluteness of
revelation and local cultural realities remained unresolved.
These issues are discussed in Hooker (1986) which has exten-
sive essays on the Burmese, Thai, Khmer, Muslim and Vietnamese
pre-modern texts. The Malay-Muslim texts are at pp 347-435. Un-
fortunately, little work seems to have been published since then.
Many Malay-Muslim and ]avanese-Muslim texts remain to be in-
vestigated.
The Colonial Re-formulation of "Islamic Laws"
The success of European legal imperialism is nowhere more clearly
demonstrated than in Dutch and British possessions in South-east
Asia. Within two decades for the British, and slightly longer for the
Dutch, Islam was reduced to a personal religion and confined to
family law. How did this happen? The answer lies in the times
(c 1800 to 1945) and in the Iegal policies adopted by the colonial rui-
ers (see below). The consequence of these imperial policies remain
alive and well into the 21't century. They still form foundations for
Islamic law in contemporary Indonesia and Malaysia (see below).
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British Colonial Law
From the late l8th century colonial legal policy rested on the
following principle (Act of Settlement, 7787):
English law is the law of general application, subject to the religions,
manners and customs of the natives, provided these exceptions are not
repugnant to justice, equity and good conscience.
Even a cursory reading of this Passage indicates its very re-
strictive nature and the judicial precedent developed throughout
the 19'h and 20th centuries confirms this. 'Religions, manners and
customs' come to be defined as family law and charitable trusts
and even within this narrow definition certain practices, valid in
religion, were either restricted or forbidden under the 'justice,
equity and good conscience' provision (for example, child mar-
riage and aspects of charitable trusts).
But there was an even more fundamental change occurring'
This was the re-formulation of shqri'ah into English law terms. Those
principles of shat4'sh permitted to exist now became described in
precedent and their validity and meaning was decided on English
legal reasoning. A new hybrid law was developed, the 'Anglo-
Muhammadan', or'Anglo-Muslim' law. (The same happened with
the'Anglo-Hindu','Burmese-Buddhism','Anglo-Chinese', and
'Malay-Adnt laws.) English judicial method absorbed the few prin-
ciples of shari'nh permitted to continue and, by the late l9thcentu-
ry, the new hybrid had taken on a life of its own. If one wished to
know what 'Islamic' Iaw was in British India or British Malaya,
then one looked to the precedent. It was certainly not necessary
to refer to the classical Arabic texts. One can even find cases from
the highest level which actually reject classical Arabic texts if ac-
ceptance would have meant overturning existing local precedent.
By 7900, a classically-trained Islamic jurist would be at complete
loss with this Anglo-Muslim law. At the same time, however/ a
common lawyer with no knowledge of Islam would be perfectly
comfortable.
The historical development of Anglo-Muslim law is described
in Hooker (7975:94-1,75) and the references there cited. The claim
that shari'ah was, and is, now knowable in English law form has
been demonstrated through data (1988-1990s) from Malaysia and
Singapore only (Hooker,7999a'.57-75). This essay shows that, even
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where classical texts are cited in the religious courts of these juris-
dictions, that material is stil subject to English-law analysis.
It is not fanciful to suggest that the classical shari'ah is not the
operative law and has not been since the colonial period. 'Islamic
law' is really Anglo-Muslim law; that is, the law that the state
makes applicable to Muslims.
Dutch Colonial Laru
The Dutch also marginalised the classical shafi'ah although by a
different method. From the 1850s it became a settled principle of
Dutch colonial legai policy that each racial group should have rts
own law, applied only to members of that group. There were sep-
arate legal universes. For Europeans, or persons assimilated to
that status, Dutch law applied. For natives it was adat (custom).
The shari'sh as such had no formal status, except to the degree or
extent permitted by any of the adat/laws.Its status was depen-
dent on recognition by adat, that is, its 'reception' into adat law.
This so-cailed'reception theory'has since dominated the admin-
istration of Islamic law in Indonesia.
Within a few years, the Dutch colonial system of separate laws
based on race began to break down and even the invention of spe-
cial conflict of laws rules (hukum antargolongan) to resolve differenc-
es proved a failure. To propose strict divisions based on race is not,
in fact, a practical proposition. People from different law groups
marry and contract across racial lines. An additional complicating
factor was the success of the Christian missionary efforts by the
end of the 19th century, creating a new class, the 'Christian Native'.
For the Muslims in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI), howev-
er, the 19th century Islamic reform movements, derived initially
from the Middle East, exacerbated the legal uncertainties of reli-
gion vis-)-vis adqt laws. To this chaotic pluralism we must also
add the effect of Dutch legal scholarship (say 1870s-1930s), which
was concerned to re-state the indigenous laws of the NEI in a
form suitable for colonial administration. This involved selection
and re-drafting of rules to make them consonant with legal plu-
ralism and suitable for the newly emerging colonial economy. These
are the contexts for the shart'ah to which we now turn.
From the point of view of the colonial administration, the ef-
fective day-to-day law for the Musiim population was adat, which
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might or might not include a reference to Islam. In fact the Islamic
reference was much wider than was first thought, particularly in
the area of family law. The response therefore was to establish a
'Priest-Court' (Priesteraad) in 1882 for Java and Madura with ju-
risdiction in marriage, divorce, inheritance and trusts (waqfl. The
judges were Muslims with some recognisable expertise, but the
courts had only limited powers to enforce their own judgments. It
appears not to have worked satisfactorily and in 7937 a new Reg-
ulation on Religious Justice was enacted. This dealt largely wiih
procedure, then as now a real difficulty; however, it also reduced
jurisdiction, confining it to marriage and divorce. Most importantly,
enforcement of decisions (except in dowry, maintenance and ex-
penses) was a matter left to the secular (Landraad) courts. These
courts might, and apparently often did, refuse enforcement, espe-
cially where immovable property was in issue.
Looking back, from the perspective of a century, we can see
that the response to the legal implications of Islam was to control
and limit the shari'qh, whilst at the same time allowing it a minimal
presence, but in a bureaucratic form. The religious courts were in
fact executive institutions: the classical shalt'ah was little, if at all,
evident as a working system of religious jurisprudence.
The most complete account of colonial legal policy in the NEI is
in Burns (1988: 748-298). This long paper covers all aspects of pol-
icy and has extensive descriptions of substantive law, the courts
and the individual statutes. It has full references to the Dutch schol-
arship from the later 19th century through to the 1950s. The only
full account of the Islam-adnt tension is Prins (1954). There is a
brief survey in Hooker (1984: 249-55). The subject has not been
properly researched so far as I know since the Prins book/ now
half a century old.
Islamic Law in the Republic of Indonesia, 1945-1990s
The Republic of Indonesia (RI) had a bitter and bloody strug-
gle for independence and one of its first acts was to establish a
Ministry of Religion in7946. For the first time Islam had a formal
presence in the modern state. Islamic political parties were also
founded but the RI was not an Islamic state; it was a secular state
-as it remains today- with a European-derived Constitution.The promulgation of that Constitution in 1945 was not, however,
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uncontested. An intense debate was carried on between secular
nationalists and those who advocated that Islam, in some way, be
the foundation of the independent republic for which all were
struggling. In the event the Islamic case was lost, although this
has not prevented the argument from resurfacing at intervals over
the past half century of independence (see Hooker and Lindsey,
this issue). The argument is quite simple; that ultimate sovereign-
ty is in God, and thus a man-made Constitution must express God's
will or at least not be contrary to it. The issue is one of authority:
who has the right to say whether a Constitution does or does not
accord with the will of God? The Islamic answer is that only those
properly qualified, the'ulamk' (religious scholars), may do this.
The 'Council of Guardians' in Iran is a contemporary answer. In-
donesia has never adopted this position but instead has the Pan-
casila ('Five Principles'), the first element of which is 'Belief in
One God'. Islam has, or can be, subsumed in some way under this
rubric so that it has become part of a national state ideology of
formal religious tolerance (except towards Judaism and some
'cults'). This reduces revelation to an ideology, the basis for which
is not God-given, but instead derives from secular political
thought. How has this secularised recognition of Islam and shari'ah
translated into effective law?
The answer is ambiguous. On the one hand, a Ministry of Reli-
gion was established in 7946, thus giving Islam a formal bureau-
cratic presence for the first time, In addition, overtly Muslim po-
litical parties were permitted (political activity in religious terms
was, of course, proscribed in the colonial period). These were con-
siderable gains for Islam, but, on the other hand, the colonial re-
gime of religious courts, with a severely restricted jurisdiction,
continued and was extended in 7957 to all parts of the newly in-
dependent republic. These courts, the Pengadilan Agama, were
under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religion, which was in
dispute with the Indonesian Supreme Court (Mahkamah Agung)
(and thus the Ministry of Justice) on this matter, a tension which is
still not resolved (see Hooker and Lindsey, this issue). The im-
portant point is that the colonial separation of jurisdiction between
the secular and the religious courts, especially in respect of mari-
tal property, was carried over into the post-independence judicial
structure. A further point is that the relisious courts were under-
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funded and under-staffed. There is a very fine and detailed ac-
count of the courts in Lev (1972). This is still the classic study.
Although the data do not go past the late 1960s, there is no reason
to doubt the accuracy of the analysis through into the 1980s.
The Religious Court system described above did, however,
undergo significant change in 1989 with the promulgation of a new
Law on Religious Justice (No 7/1989). The larger part of this stat-
ute is concerned with establishing procedural matters; these in-
clude staffing, forms for administration, costs and so on. For the
rest, jurisdiction is the main subject and this, in many ways, re-
peats the Dutch and later post-independence laws. Essentially, the
Religious Courts are family law courts and the main subject is di-
vorce and property settlement arising out of divorce. There is a
useful survey up to the mid-1980s of Islamic law administration in
the New Order government by Cammack (1989). This has materi-
aI on courts and judges and also deals with family law.
The second significant change occurred in 1991 with the publi-
cation of the Compilation of Islamic Law (Kompilasi) by Presiden-
tial Instruction (see Hooker and Lindsey, this issue). It is a code of
law for the Religious Courts, although it describes itself as a'guide'.
It sets out the basic sources of law and then follows these with a
summary version of the classical law on marriage, inheritance and
trusts. A fuller discussion can be found in Hooker 0999b). This is
merely an outline of the colonial structure and its revival after
independence. There are as yet little data on how the reformed
Religious Courts and the Kompilasi actually work. On the Indone-
sian shari'ah system generally, see Hooker and Lindsey (this is-
sue).
Useful sources on contemporary shafi'ah jurisprudence include
the legal journal Mimbar Hukum and the more general Studia Is-
lsmika.
Islamic Law in Malaysia, 1950s-2001
The colonial legacy in Malaysia was the Anglo-Musiim prece-
dent and, from the 1950s, legislation (Administration of Islamic
(sometimes 'Muslim') Law) in each of the States of the Federation.
The Federal Constitution of 7957 declares Islam to be the 'Reli-
gion of the Federation'. The Ninth schedule, List I, gives power to
the States to legislate for religion. The story of the past half centu-
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ry is thus an account of the complex and unresolved interplay be-
tween the Constitution of Malaysia (1963), the secular, invented
Anglo-Muslim precedent and post-independence legislation.
The obvious place to begin is the legislation in the States of the
Federation, including the Federal Territory. While there are dif-
ferences in the detailed rules amongst the States, all the legisla-
tion deals with three areas of law.
The first is what one might describe as the 'official determina-
tion' of principle. Here the legislation establishes a Majelis (Coun-
cil), which oversees finances, courts and, most importantly, estab-
lishes FatwA Committees. These committees issue opinions on
points of principle relating to law and dogma. The opinion is bind-
ing in the State for which it is issued. The status of fnthznh has
always been contentious in the Anglo-Muslim precedent. While
the terms on which fatkwk may be issued are set down in the State
Enactments, that is, the sources for them are in the classical juris-
prudence of the four Sunni schools, these are not 'known' in the
English law sense (that is, in the rules of evidence). Admissibility,
therefore, depends on the existing rules of evidence, precedent
on which it had already decided that 'Muslim' law was a local
law' that could not simply be found' but had to be proved. In
addition, the Constitutions of 1.957 (Federation of Malaya) and
1963 (Malaysia) distinguished between the secular and religious
courts and it was the former that had ultimate authority. We re-
turn to this point below but it should be kept in mind that this
aspect of the standard State iegislation has serious difficulties.
The second part of the States' enactments esiablishes the Reli-
gious Courts and sets out jurisdiction, which is essentially in fam-
ily law and trusts. Again, this raised difficulties with the secular
courts which, in a series of decisions from the 1960s to the 1980s,
reiterated their overriding jurisdiction relying on federal statutes
made under federal constitutional authority. To be sure, very few
cases came up to the High Courts or the Federal Court in Muslim
family law matters. The vast majority of applicants to the Reii-
gious Courts were poor and mostly women. But there were enough
appeals at the higher level to demonstrate the inequality of the
two respective jurisdictions.
The final part of the State enactments sets out the substantive
principles of shart'nh. These are family law, parts of the law of
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propertv and offenses against religion. The actual rules are accu-
rate short summaries from fiqh textbooks. The notable feature is
that while the rules certainly state principles, they are drafted in a
form that recognises bureaucratic administration. In this they are
like any other statute. The result is that the success or otherwise
of any action depends as much on forms and formality as it does
on its correctness in fiqh principle.
The legislation has been much elaborated from the 1980s in all
the States. There are now several enactments in each State, which
go into each of these three aspects of shqri'nh administration in
increasing detail. In particular, the subject of offenses has been
widened to include such areas as apostasy. In fact, in the past 20
years shari'ah has become increasingly defined in criminal law terms.
In 1993, the State of Kelantan even proposed the introduction of
the seventh century Arab penalties of mutilation and amputation
for a variety of offenses. Unhappily, this is largely politically driv-
en. Nothing has come of it in practice, however, due to the Feder-
aI Constitution and separation of jurisdiction which have rendered
such initiatives unenforceable.
The Federal Constitution is central and nowhere more so than
in the vexed issue of secular court-Religious Court jurisdiction. As
we saw above, the latter is dependent and derivative, with the
possibiiity always that an appeal could overturn a Religious Court
judgment on grounds that had nothing to do with shari'qh. There
was enormous resentment about this and the Federal Government
attempted to deal with it in 1988 by way of constitutional amend-
ment. There was a new art 121(IA) which provides:
[The secular courts] shail have no jurisdiction in respect of any matter
witl-rin the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah Courts.
There is precedent on what this article means from both the
High Courts and the Federal Courts. The conclusion is that the
Religious Courts have exclusive jurisdiction in respect of the mat-
ters specified in the Ninth Schedule to the Constitution. While this
solves the jurisdiction issue, and could dispose of the Anglo-Mus-
lim precedent, the fact remains that the definition of what is 'reli-
gious'/'reiigion' is still a matter for the secular courts.
But what actually is the shni'sh in the Religious Courts: is it fiqh
or something else, or both? Recent data show that while the courts
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certainly rely on the classic texts of fiqh, the way in which ihey
deal with them, especially at Appeal Board level, is through En-
glish-derived methods of legal analysis. Thus, we have 'precedent',
'persuasive', the practice of 'distinguishing' and so on. The earlier
Anglo-Muslim precedent is not cited. Instead we now have a new,
indigenous form being created. It even has its own law reports of
record, the lurnal Hukum.
These are the contexts for shsri'ah in modern Malaysia. The most
comprehensive description is by Horowitz (7994). This is an esPe-
cially interesting paper because Horowitz examines the legisla-
tion in terms such as 'evolution', 'utilitarian' and 'social change'.
These are not classes in classical shari'ah or in the Anglo-Muslim
common law. On the other hand, he also uses 'dualism' and 'syn-
cretism' which are concepts of law (and history) well understood
in South-east Asia and it is to these that we now turn.
The Originality of Shart'qh in South-east Asia
It may appear strange to scholars of classical Islam to conflate
'originality' and shqri'nh in one place. But this conflation does not
deny the universality of Islam nor does it question revelation. All
it says is that in Indonesia and Malaysia the shafi'ah is now ex-
pressed in forms which are particular to these places for the Mus-
lims of these two States. These forms of expression originated in
South-east Asia. When one asks 
-'what is Islamic law in Indone-
sia and Malaysia?'- the answers are the originalities described
above. We have the pre-modern texts where Islam is a point of
reference for definitions of sovereignty. This is followed by colo-
nial reformulations and, now, the contemporary versions of these
in the 21't century.
Where, then, is the 'pure' shnfi'nh? Has it disappeared? The an-
swer is 'yes', as a working system, that actually determines indi-
vidual obligation. On the other hand, it exists in the texts which
remain, in some ways/ its only 'true' expression. The essence of
the modern revival movements is to regain a primacy for the texts,
to inject their contents and reasoning into the working legal sys-
tem. After 30 years or so there has been only moderate success,
some would say minimal and it would be a rash Person who would
predict the future. All we can do is take the historical and contem-
porary data'from the place' as the primary reference and this means
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understanding the localised expressions of sheri'nh in their own
terms.
This is not a new argumen| the centrality of the local data has
been a feature of historical studies for the past 40 years. The argu-
ment says, in the case of Islam, that the local version is historical-
ly, sociologically and legally true'and is not a corruption or deni-
al of the 'pure' (that is, Arabic) Islam. The argument is put in de-
tail in the collection edited by Hooker (1983). There are also valu-
able essays on history, philosophy, literature, sociology, law and
poliiics. More recent scholarship over the past 20 years has con-
firmed the earlier arguments, although some of the data in the
earlier essays are now out of date.
The validity of the argument in the various disciplines has not,
however, prevented claims from within South-east Asian Islam to
the contrary. These seek to show a 'corruption' of revelation and
the necessity for a return to an Arab(ic) purity. This is the so-
called 'fundamentalist' position. It requires a denial of one's own
history, and the validity of one's culture and language. It is a-
historical in that it ignores variation within and between commu-
nities throughout Muslim history. It is also wholly impractical ex-
cept under severe repression (as the example of the late unlament-
ed Taliban movement has shown). Most often the argument is
political. There is little in the way of showing that the fiqh can'in
practice'be an appropriate law for a modern nation state. Even
more important, none of the examples I have seen shows how a
transition from the contemporary accommodation to something
more 'pure' can be managed. Transitions are always problematic,
particularly when the reform of law is involved. They are even
more so when the 'reform'becomes 'replacement', in this case with
a jurisprudence founded in revelation, the main principles of which
were established 1300 years ago.
Much of the discussion in Indonesia and Malaysia is carried on
in journals and magazines. In Malaysia the journal Harakah is infor-
mative and in Indonesia the Medin Dnkwah publications are a pri-
mary source.
In English, the most up-to-date source is Hefner (2000) which
deals with Indonesia. Unfortunately, there is no equivalent for
Malaysia in exactly the same sort of way but there are two collec-
tions of essays from within Islam, which take on purity of revela-
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tion. Iaw and the modern state: Othman (7994) and Ismail (1995).
These two collections are another form of originality, as they are
edited and largely written by Muslim women.
The Wider Context: Western Perceptions of Islam
For all of the 19'h and 20n centuries the originalities of South-
east Asian Islam have been ignored, underplayed or dismissed by
Europeans. The reason is obvious. The British and the Dutch were
in charge, not just politically, economically and military, but intel-
lectually as well. They set the agenda as to what Islam was and
how it was to be formulated. It was thus possible to claim in early
20th century British Malaya that'Islam has destroyed classical Malay
culture'; and, in the NEI, that Indonesians are only 'nominal Mus-
lims'. It was perceptions such as these that allowed, even made
necessary, the reformulations of shnri'ah. The result for contempo-
rary shari'ah is its compression into the European-derived forms
of code, statute and precedent'
But there is a wider context. The West does generally view
Islam through law in the biased and intemperate reporting of iihfid
(in this genre, the word is equated with terrorism'); the subjuga-
tion of women (the reality is more complex); 'Islamic penalties'
(simplistically seen as physical mutilation); and fathwd (equated,
with gross inaccuracy, with the death sentence). These are crude
and obvious examples. They are primitive constructions of the'oth-
er', the East, of the kind against which many writers have vigor-
ously protested (Said, 1978). At the same time, however, the temp-
tation to construct remains and there are quite sophisticated forms
in circulation todaY.
The best example comes from the eminent novelist, VS Naipaul
(2000: I):
Islam is not simply a matter of conscience or private belief. It makes
imperial demands. [A Muslim's] world view alters. His holy places are rn
Arab lands; his sacred language is Arabic. His idea of history alters' He
rejects his own; he becomes, whether he likes it or not, a part of the Arab
story. [He1 has to turn away from everything that is his. The disturbance
for socieiies is immense, and even after a thousand years can remain unre-
solved; the turning away has to be done again and again. People develop
fantasies about who and what they are; and i.n the Islam of [non-Arab]
countries there is an element of neurosis and nihilism'
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Naipaul's stories make the individual characters come alive with
all their frailties, inconsistencies and uncertainties; a long way from
the certainties of Arabic imperiaiism and the imperatives of reve-
Iation. But it is not so far from such personal inconsistencies to the
Iegal originalities described above. These are also uncertain and
are outside or, better, do not acknowledge, Arab imperialism but
they exist and they work. Western lawyers place great value on
certainty and perhaps underestimate the fact that inconsistency is
also a fact of common or civil law legal life. The originalities, as I
have described them, may be inconsistent in how they express the
immutable truths of revelation but that does not necessarily mean
they are incompetent or not viable systems of belief.
The Essays in this Issue
(The first three papers in this issue originally appeared in the
Australisn lournal of Asian Lnw (vol4 (3),2002) and are reproduced
here with the permission of Mr Chris Holt, managing director of
Federation Press. We acknowledge, with thanks, his generosity).
The choice of essays for this special issue must be justified. To
make sense they need to have a commonality or, at least, address
a common issue. 'Islamic law' on its own is not sufficient. We find
this common issue when we take the question, fundamental to
Islam in the 21"t century, of whether the classical jurisprudence of
Islam is still a working system of law in the contemporary nation
state. 'Working system' means (a) principles determining obliga-
tion, which (b) are actually implemented. It is suggested that this
is, at best, debatable. Indeed, as mentioned, there is a strong ar-
gument that the classical jurisprudence is dead as a working sys-
tem. Under the twin impulses of colonialism and, later, globalisa-
tion, it has been replaced by secular definitions which allow or
incorporate parts of shari'ah but do not allow classical legal think-
ing. The methods of reasoning now are not those in the fiqh texts;
instead, the intellectual agenda is set by the civil or common law.
Is this true? This seems to us to be the fundamental question fac-
ing governments of Muslim populations.
We have chosen four essays, which, between them, show just
how complex the answer can be. More importantly, the answers
are not separate from each other but related in various ways. We
tend to forget these relations. As history has shown many times,
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shari'cth is a whole and, while one may separate out elements ac-
cording to one's interest or intentions, these parts can never truly
be isolated from each other. So it is with the essays in this issue.
They may appear to be on separate topics but essentially they come
back to the main question: the status of classical reasoning in the
21"t century nation state. They show us alternatives: that the clas-
sical legal reasoning is decisive; secondly, that it is for the most
part merely referential in modern South-east Asia; thirdly, that it
can be radically rethought and finally, that it can be manipulated.
These are now considered in turn.
Shari'ah Decisiae
This is the subject of the first article in this issue by Nadirsyah
Hosen. For Islam to be decisive is unusual in Indonesia but it does
occur in a very significant field, the giving of fntw7 (rulings/opin-
ions on a point of a law). With one exception, the bodies which
issue fafiw| (singular: fatwA) are outside state-controlled Islam but
they are all the more important for this reason. They have an in-
dependence, untrammeled by legislation or judicial formaiity. The
result is published opinion on a wide variety of subjects, often
contradicting official state policy.
There are four main fatfrwk-issuing bodies, distinguished from
each other by stated difference in their methods of reasoning. A
t'ntwhbegins with a question to a recognised scholar, or group/
'collective' of scholars who give an answer. The answer is not bind-
ing in the same way that a judicial decision is binding. If one is not
satisfied one can go elsewhere. That, at least, is the classical theo-
ry of fatwfr.In addition, those who give fatkwfr must be recognised
authorities. Those so recognised in Indonesia, at least by their
followers are Nahdlatul 'Ulama (NU) (Renewal of the Scholar);
Muhammadiyah; Persatuan Islam (Persis) (Union of Islam); and
Majlis 'Ulama Indonesia (MUI) (the Indonesian'Ulama Council).
These are the four main fathwk-issuing bodies; there are other,
minor, sources. Is there actually an Arabic intellectual imperial-
ism? The answer is 'yes, up to a point', in the method as set in the
disciplines taughi in Mecca, Medina and Al-Azhar in Cairo. These
were, and are, known in Indonesian institutions teaching Islam.
The pesantren (private Islamic boarding schools) 
- 
aiso pondok-
still provide an Arabic-focused education. The modern equivalent
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are the IAIN (Institut Agama Islam Negeri, State Islamic Insti-
tutes), funded by the Ministry of Religion but now with a much
wider curriculum (see Hooker and Lindsey, this issue).
On the other hand, thefatdzufrin these sources are firmly ground-
ed in the facts of Indonesian Muslim life. Strict 'Arabic' applica-
tions of prescription are just not possible or practical and the fatkwk,
from each source, do recognise this. The degree of recognition
varies. In fact, it is impossible to ask for perfect consistency over
time (the past 100 years). As I have said earlier, we may place too
much emphasis on certainty especially where a practical interpre-
tation of a revealed reiigion is the issue.
These questions are fully discussed in Hooker (2003). This book
has chapters on method, ritual, the status of women, Islam and
modern science, and Islam and the state. The basic material is the
collection of fatkwfr from the four sources described above.
The Shari'ah is Referential
By this I mean the laws which apply to 'Muslims', as opposed
to 'Islamic law'. The former apPears in codes, statutes, precedents
and administrative regulations, all of which are European-derived'
It is characteristic of the colonial and post-colonial state in which
the intention was, and still is, to control Islam. This is achieved by
reference to selected parts of shafi'qh incorporated into the Euro-
pean form and defined and implemented through the techniques
of that form. The shqri'ah thus becomes bureaucratised and, of
course, diminished. The most significant legacy of 1400 years of
scholarship is largely ignored. There is no longer an 'Islamic law'
although it is called by that term.
This is the subject of the article in this issue by Hooker and
Lindsey: just what is the reference in Indonesia? They argue that
it is the modern forms as, for example, in the revised Religious
Courts Law and in the Kompilasi. It is time now to examine these
modern forms and a striking example is the text on the Religious
Courts produced by the Department of Religion.
The text, Sketsa Perqdilan Agnma ('sketch of Religious Justice'),
was produced in 1.998 by the Department of Religion and, in the
foreword, sets out its aims: (a) to provide information on the reli-
gious justice system, so as to (b) avoid 'common misunderstand-
ings and false criticisms'. This theme is continued in the Introduc-
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tion, 'providing services to the community', to 'realise Indone-
sia's religious aspirations' and to 'complement other government
institutions'. The text then gives a short history of reiigious courts
in Indonesia starting in the 16th century and praising the ideals of
Islam. There is no mention of the colonial Dutch Religious Courts.
The section on the status and functions of the court is simplv a
summary of the 7997 Law on Religious Justice.
More striking from the referential point of view is a quite elab-
orate section on "vision' and 'mission'which asserts the disrance
of the courts from the classicai shai'cth. The following quotation
speaks for itself:
The Vision of the Religious Courts
The function of the Religious Courts in the future wiII derrve
from the vision that the Religious Court wiII always be an institu-
tion for the upholding of truth and justice in a professional, effec-
tive, efficient and modern manner in accordance with its authori-
ty and will always serve the nation and religion by providing top
quality legal service to the seekers of justice, within the national
legal system and based on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
The institution of Religious Courts is convinced that justice, truth,
order and legal certainty in the law and legal practice is essential
in creating a safe, secure and orderly environment blessed by God.
In view of the dignity and nobleness of the key duty of the Reli-
gious Courts, namely the implementation of positive Isiamic law
in settling family disputes between Indonesians of Muslim faith,
and considering that the family has a strategic role as the smallest
unit of society and the development of the community and the
nation, therefore the Religious Courts will continue to demonstrate
concern for the principles of justice, truth, order and legal certain-
ty, paying particular attention to social changes and the develop-
ment of values as a result of progress in science and technology,
and will optimally achieve speedy, simple and economic justice.
The criteria for success of the Religious Courts in future will be:
Firsf: Succeed in implementing the basic duties of the Religious
Courts in fostering the creation of a safe, secure and orderly com-
munity as an integral component of civil society.
Second'. Succeed in putting intrinsic and extrinsic values into
practice. The values of Islamic justice based on the universal val-
Studia Islamike, Vol. 10, No. 1.,2003
lslamic Lszu in South-Esst Asia 79
ues of Islam will be the foundation for the work ethic of judges
and other staff of the Religious Courts.
Third: Succeed in implementing their function in a constructive
and optimistic manner for the development of the nation, in par-
ticular for the development of the national law. The existence,
progress and performance of the Religious Courts will always be
honored and will obtain legitimacy from the community, both for-
mal and cultural.
The Mission of the Religious Courts
To settle family disputes among Muslims as precisely and fair-
ly as possible to achieve public welfare by upholding the princi-
ples, determinations and legal objectives of Islam as well as con-
tinuously paying attention to changes in the community in the
frame work of the national legal system."
It is this passage which is to the point here (the rest of the text
describes bureaucratic procedures and gives elaborate statistics).
'Vision' uses terms such as 'truth', 'justice', 'professional','effi-
cient', 'modern', the 'nation' and, most important, 'based on Pan-
casila and the 1945 Constitution'. God only blesses an environ-
ment created on these bases; He is not, in this version at least, the
creator of the environment. Later in the 'Vision Statement' we
have a reference to 'social change' and technology'.It is only at
the end of the Statement that we have a passing reference to the
'universal values of Islam'. These are not specified.
When this passage is read with the actual structure of the court(s)
and with the Kompilasl, it is difficult to avoid the argument that
this is an essentially referential system.
From the internal point of view of classical scholarship 
-the
purist view- these comments make dismal reading. Is there no
fiqh response to the challenge of modernity? This is the subject of
Mark Cammack's article, as well as a more general article by Aj-
mand Ahmad.
Re-thinking Shari'ahi
Cammack approaches this issue by way of analysing the work
of the Indonesian scholar Hazairin, whose theory of bilateral in-
heritance attempted a reformulation of the farf id (inheritance)
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rwles. Fark'idis a highly complicated technical subject and the main
thrust of Hazairin's argument is an attempt to re-interpret the rules
so as to make possible an advance in the rights of qualified fe-
males; in other words, to bring them nearer to equality with the
qualified male inheritors. This is very hard to do because the farh'id
rules are in Qur'An and are thus set forever as revealed.
Hazairin discusses the issue by way of analytical classes; the
issues of representation and priority among classes. The discus-
sion here is on interpretation of Qur'dn and is not wholly convinc-
ing. In fact, his interpretations are strained and inconsistent. They
are not acceptable amongst the totality of Indonesian'ulami'.
However, the 1950s are half a century away and we now read
Hazairin in the new millennium and in the current circumstances
of Indonesian Islam. The latter include the new Law on Religious
Justice (7991) and the Kompilasi (1989) (see Hooker and Lindsey,
this issue). In these new contexts it is possible that Hazairin's pro-
posais may yet come to fruition despite their radical nature and
Cammack's essay suggests how this might occur. Of course, time
will tell. It is worth noting in passing that there is no Malaysian
equivalent for Hazairin.
Another approach to the re-thinking of shafi'nh is illustrated in
Ahmad's essay where the focus is on competing methodologies with
reference to women, human rights and contemporary Islam. This is
a huge subject but in this paper the author confines herself to a
specific set of material so as to narrow the issue. All too often this is
not done and, as a consequence, argument very quickly degener-
ates into generalities, mostly driven by personal and/or political
bias. Such is illustrated in Ahmad's discussion of Western feminist
comment on Islam, Muslim women and human rights where, in quite
influential books, we find a combination of inappropriate theory
with no understanding of fiqh. The theory looks convincing to a
Western reader because it is Western. The insidious nature of the
assumptions involved is demonstrated in Ahmad's discussion of
Iranian and Malaysian Muslim feminist writings in which we can
find an "internalised orientalism". All that this means is that West-
ern feminist theory has set the agenda and determines the method
of argument, a position which is not acceptable.
The better approach may be found in Fazlur Rahman and Mu-
hammad Shahrur. Both authors take us into a rational hermeneutic
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(see HallAq in the references in this paper) which aiso has its varia-
tions in Indonesia (see Hooker, lndonesinn Islnm (2003)). The point is
that one must establish a method - ijilh\d - which does not do violence
to ftqhbut at the same time is practical in the modern nation state. All
that we can say at the moment is that dissonance is the norm.
Sharfah as Manipulnted
This means exactly what it says. There are circumstances, and
quite important ones, in which the classifications and forms of shafi'ah
are used, manipulated, on purpose, so as to justify legal transactions.
The shari'sh in fact is used to give a colour of legitimacy to transac-
tions which are essentially foreign to its nature. The paper by Rich-
ards in this issue on "Islamic" conttacts in Malaysia illustrates how
this happens. He deals with Islamic banking/economics contracts
of sale, hire, loan and purchase on credit. While much of the "Islam-
ic economics" is theoreticai and rather wishful in its approach (actu-
ally true of this "dismal science" generally). Richards concentrates
on the actual contracts themselves. He finds that although topped
and tailed with terms drawn from medieval Muslim commercial
practice the terms and conditions of the contracts are purely En-
glish/Malaysian commercial Law. Aqhd couldnot understand them
and certainly not adjudicate on them. The Malaysian religious courts
in fact have no jurisdiction and disputes go to the secular courts
where the discussion is wholly in English/Malaysian commercial
precedent and statutes. This is a true instance of manipulation.
Conclusion
It is clear from these five essays and from the bibliographical ma-
terial that the shari'nh in Indonesia and Malaysia is in a state of rapid
change. While its forms are derived from the respective colonial his-
tories, the past 50 years have seen developments which are original
to the area. The variety of answers which one must now give to the
question 
-'what is shari'ahz'- are evidence of this. Whether one
wishes to describe the material as a new regional mndhhab (jurispru-
dential school of thought) has now become a pertinent issue and this
is considered in more detail by Hooker and Lindsey (this issue).
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